Cauchy, infinitesimals and ghosts of departed quantifiers by Bair, Jacques et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
2.
00
22
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.H
O]
  1
 D
ec
 20
17
CAUCHY, INFINITESIMALS AND GHOSTS OF
DEPARTED QUANTIFIERS
JACQUES BAIR, PIOTR B LASZCZYK, ROBERT ELY, VALE´RIE HENRY,
VLADIMIR KANOVEI, KARIN U. KATZ, MIKHAIL G. KATZ,
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Abstract. Procedures relying on infinitesimals in Leibniz, Euler
and Cauchy have been interpreted in both a Weierstrassian and
Robinson’s frameworks. The latter provides closer proxies for the
procedures of the classical masters. Thus, Leibniz’s distinction be-
tween assignable and inassignable numbers finds a proxy in the
distinction between standard and nonstandard numbers in Robin-
son’s framework, while Leibniz’s law of homogeneity with the im-
plied notion of equality up to negligible terms finds a mathematical
formalisation in terms of standard part. It is hard to provide paral-
lel formalisations in a Weierstrassian framework but scholars since
Ishiguro have engaged in a quest for ghosts of departed quantifiers
to provide a Weierstrassian account for Leibniz’s infinitesimals.
Euler similarly had notions of equality up to negligible terms, of
which he distinguished two types: geometric and arithmetic. Eu-
ler routinely used product decompositions into a specific infinite
number of factors, and used the binomial formula with an infi-
nite exponent. Such procedures have immediate hyperfinite ana-
logues in Robinson’s framework, while in a Weierstrassian frame-
work they can only be reinterpreted by means of paraphrases de-
parting significantly from Euler’s own presentation. Cauchy gives
lucid definitions of continuity in terms of infinitesimals that find
ready formalisations in Robinson’s framework but scholars working
in a Weierstrassian framework bend over backwards either to claim
that Cauchy was vague or to engage in a quest for ghosts of de-
parted quantifiers in his work. Cauchy’s procedures in the context
of his 1853 sum theorem (for series of continuous functions) are
more readily understood from the viewpoint of Robinson’s frame-
work, where one can exploit tools such as the pointwise definition
of the concept of uniform convergence. As case studies, we ana-
lyze the approaches of Craig Fraser and Jesper Lu¨tzen to Cauchy’s
contributions to infinitesimal analysis, as well as Fraser’s approach
toward Leibniz’s theoretical strategy in dealing with infinitesimals.
The insights by philosophers Ian Hacking and others into the im-
portant roles of contextuality and contingency tend to undermine
Fraser’s interpretive framework. Keywords: historiography; infini-
tesimal; Latin model; butterfly model; law of continuity; ontology;
practice; Cauchy; Leibniz. MSC: 01A45, 01A55, 01A85
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Some folks see quantifiers when there are none,
Yet others miss infinitesimals when there are some.
Of history each one is a subversive brat,
Aping the great triumvirate,
While ignoring the insights of Robinson.
(A folk limerick)
1. Introduction
Any given period of the past was characterized by certain practices
and procedures of mathematical researchers. Such practice may pos-
sess affinities with the practice of modern mathematics, whether of
Weierstrassian or other variety. Practice reflects something fundamen-
tal about the subject as tackled and experienced by working mathe-
maticians that is not always expressed in formal foundational and/or
ontological work. Lurking within past practice are unexplored poten-
tialities or possibilities. Some such possibilities did not develop fully
due to contingent factors, but might have developed. Recent mathe-
matical work can help us in doing history of mathematics by elucidating
potentialities within past mathematical practice.
Our approach differs from that of Barabashev [6] who develops an
absolute thesis in favor of presentism in the historiography of mathe-
matics. We are not arguing that one should use modern mathematics
to interpret the past. While we are not making any such absolute claim,
the thesis we wish to develop is a relative one: to the extent that histo-
rians are already using a modern framework to interpret Leibniz, Euler,
and Cauchy, namely a Weierstrassian one, we argue that a better fit for
the procedures of these masters is provided by a modern infinitesimal
framework. Our thesis is not that one should apriori use a modern
framework, but that such a modern infinitesimal framework is prefer-
able to the one traditionally trained historians often rely upon.
We argue, following the familiar Lakatosian dictum, that history of
mathematics without philosophy of mathematics is blind. More specif-
ically, a historiography of mathematics that fails to pay attention to
the dichotomy of procedure versus ontology is flawed. Following Ian
Hacking, we point out that in the historical evolution of mathematics
the amount of contingency is greater than is often thought. In par-
ticular, this undermines the claim that the historical development of
analysis led to modern classical Weierstrassian analysis implying that
4 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., T.K., S.K., T.M., T. M., D.S., AND D.S.
the latter must serve as a primary reference point and interpretative
framework.
We compare distinct methodologies in the historiography of mathe-
matics and point out some pitfalls inherent in neglecting the distinction
of procedure versus ontology, with application to the history of infini-
tesimal analysis. As case studies we analyze Jesper Lu¨tzen’s approach
to Cauchy and Craig Fraser’s approach toward both Leibniz’s theoret-
ical strategy in dealing with infinitesimals and Cauchy’s contributions
to infinitesimal analysis. The insights by philosophers Ian Hacking and
others into the important roles of contextuality and contingency tend
to undermine Lu¨tzen’s and Fraser’s interpretive framework.
In 2013, Bair et al. [3] presented some elements of the history of in-
finitesimal mathematics often unseen in the received approach to the
history of analysis, based as it is upon a default Weierstrassian foun-
dation taken as a primary point of reference. Fraser responded in 2015
with a number of criticisms in [40], but his position suffers from some of
the very misconceptions analyzed in [3]. These include an insufficient
attention to crucial distinctions such as practice and procedure versus
ontology as developed by Benacerraf [11], Quine [80], and others. The
panoramic nature of Fraser’s survey enables a panoramic overview of
the problematic aspects of the received historiography of mathematical
analysis as it is practiced today.
We spell out some important dichotomies in Section 2. We start with
an analysis of Lu¨tzen’s approach in Section 3 and proceed to Fraser’s
starting in Section 4.
2. Dichotomies
Two dichotomies are useful in analyzing the history of analysis:
Archimedean versus Bernoullian, on the one hand, and procedure ver-
sus ontology, on the other. We will analyze these dichotomies in more
detail in this section.
2.1. Parallel tracks. We propose a view of the history of analysis
as evolving along separate, and sometimes competing, tracks. These
are the A-track, based upon an Archimedean continuum; and B-track,
based upon what could be termed a Bernoullian (i.e., infinitesimal-
enriched) continuum. Scholars attribute the first systematic use of
infinitesimals as a foundational concept to Johann Bernoulli. While
Leibniz exploited both infinitesimal methods and exhaustion meth-
ods usually interpreted in the context of an Archimedean continuum
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(see Bascelli et al. [7]), Bernoulli never wavered from the infinitesimal
methodology.1
Historians often view the work in analysis from the 17th to the mid-
dle of the 19th century as rooted in a background notion of continuum
that is not punctiform.2 This necessarily creates a tension with modern,
punctiform theories of the continuum, be it the A-type set-theoretic
continuum as developed by Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrass, and others;
or B-type continua as developed by Edwin Hewitt [52] in 1948, Jerzy
 Los´ [73] in 1955, Abraham Robinson [82] in 1966, and others. How can
one escape a trap of presentism in interpreting the past from the view-
point of set-theoretic foundations commonly accepted today, whether
of type A or B?
2.2. Procedure versus ontology. A possible answer to the query
formulated at the end of Section 2.1 resides in a distinction between
procedure and ontology. In analyzing the work of Fermat, Leibniz,
Euler, Cauchy, and other great mathematicians of the past, one must
be careful to distinguish between
(1) its syntactic aspects, i.e., actual mathematical practice involv-
ing procedures and inferential moves, and,
(2) semantic aspects related to the justification, typically in a set-
theoretic foundational framework, of entities like the points of
the continuum, i.e., issues of the ontology of mathematical en-
tities like numbers or points.
In his work on Euler and Cauchy, historian Detlef Laugwitz was care-
ful not to attribute modern set-theoretic constructions to work dating
from before the heroic 1870s, and focused instead on their procedures
(concerning Laugwitz see Section 7). This theme is developed further
in Section 4.3.
On the procedure/entity distinction, Abraham Robinson noted that
“from a formalist point of view we may look at our theory syntactically
and may consider that what we have done is to introduce new deductive
procedures rather than new mathematical entities” [82, p. 282] (empha-
sis in the original). Kanovei et al. [57] analyze Robinson’s answer to a
long-standing challenge by Felix Klein and Abraham Fraenkel.
1To note the fact of such systematic use by Bernoulli is not to say that Bernoulli’s
foundation is adequate, or that it could distinguish between manipulations with
infinitesimals that produce only true results and those manipulations that can yield
false results.
2Historians use the term punctiform to refer to a continuum thought of as being
made out of points. The term has a different meaning in modern topology that
does not concern us here.
6 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., T.K., S.K., T.M., T. M., D.S., AND D.S.
Whereas the article on Cauchy’s sum theorem by Bascelli et al. [10]
focuses on the details of that result of Cauchy and argues that Robin-
son’s framework provides the best avenue for interpreting it, the present
text takes a broader lens and identifies many problems in contemporary
historiography of mathematics, using the work of Lu¨tzen and Fraser as
examples.
3. “We miss our quantifiers”
In a chapter contributed to a 2003 collection entitled A History of
Analysis, Lu¨tzen writes:
(1) To the modern eye Cauchy’s definitions may seem
wordy, vague and not particularly rigorous. (2) We miss
our quantifiers, our ε’s, δ’s and N ’s, and in most cases
our inequalities. [74, p. 161] (emphasis and sentence
numbering added)
Lest a hasty reader should interpret Lu¨tzen’s comment as a frank ac-
knowledgment of the futility of a quest for ghosts of departed quantifiers
in Cauchy, Lu¨tzen continues:
(3) However, as has been pointed out in particular by
Grabiner . . . all these ingredients are clearly present
when Cauchy starts using his concepts in proofs. (4) In
particular the complicated proofs are strikingly modern
in appearance. (ibid.) (emphasis and sentence number-
ing added)
The clause “all these ingredients” in sentence (3) refers to the ε’s, δ’s
and N ’s mentioned in sentence (2). What Lu¨tzen is claiming is that
the ε’s, δ’s and N ’s appear in Cauchy’s proofs, thereby making them
“modern in appearance” as per sentence (4). It is worth pondering
the implications of Lu¨tzen’s apparent assumption that the adjective
modern necessarily means ε, δ. Such an assumption is indicative of a
view of analysis as a teleological process with a specific implied modern
outcome, which is decidedly not that of modern infinitesimals. To
escape the trap of presentism, Lu¨tzen could have used the expression
(in the terminology of Section 2.1) “strikingly A-track modern”3 or
some such equivalent turn of phrase. But being “strikingly B-track
modern” is apparently not an option in Lu¨tzen’s book.
Yet Sinkevich pertinently points out that Cauchy’s proofs all lack a
characteristic feature of a modern epsilontic proof (“for each ε there
3In fact Lu¨tzen appears to interpret the title of the collection his essay appeared in
as referring to “A-History of Analysis.”
CAUCHY, INFINITESIMALS AND GHOSTS OF DEPARTED QUANTIFIERS 7
exists δ, etc.”), namely exhibiting an explicit functional dependence
of δ on ε; see Sinkevich [89]. Attempts to provide A-type exhaustion
justifications for results in analysis do not originate with Cauchy and
go back at least to Leibniz. See e.g., Knobloch [68] for an analysis of
an exhaustion procedure in Leibniz, and Bl˚asjo¨ [12] for an analysis of
its limitations.
3.1. Cauchy’s variables. Lu¨tzen claims that “Cauchy writes that a
variable having 0 as its limit becomes infinitely small” [74, p. 163]. How-
ever, Lu¨tzen’s paraphrase of Cauchy’s definition misstates the order of
the significant clauses in Cauchy’s own formulation. In fact, Cauchy’s
comment about the limit appears not before (as in Lu¨tzen) but after
Cauchy’s 1823 definition of infinitesimal:
Lorsque les valeurs nume´riques successives d’une meˆme
variable de´croissent inde´finiment, de manie`re a` s’abaisser
au-dessous de tout nombre donne´, cette variable devient
ce qu’on nomme un infiniment petit ou une quantite´ in-
finiment petite. Une variable de cette espe`ce a ze´ro pour
limite.4 [24, p. 4] (emphasis in the original)
This indicates that limit is defined in terms of a variable quantity that
becomes arbitrarily small, rather than vice versa. Indeed Cauchy wrote
earlier:
Lorsque les valeurs successivement attribue´es a` une meˆme
variable s’approchent inde´finiment d’une valeur fixe, de
manie`re a` finir par en diffe´rer aussi peu que l’on voudra,
cette dernie`re est appele´e la limite de toutes les autres.5
[24, p. 1] (emphasis in the original)
The italics on limite indicate that this is the concept Cauchy is in the
process of defining. Thus Cauchy defines both limits and infinitesimals
in terms of the primitive notion of variable quantity, rather than using
limit as a fundamental concept. Lu¨tzen goes on to claim that
[t]he standard interpretation, also adopted by Grabiner,
is that the limit concept is the central one and infinitesi-
mals only enter as useful abbreviations for variables hav-
ing the limit zero [74, p. 163]
4Translation: “When the successive numerical values [i.e., absolute values] of the
same variable diminish indefinitely in such a way as to dip below each given num-
ber, this variable becomes what one calls an infinitely small or an infinitely small
quantity. A variable of this type has limit zero.”
5Translation: “When the values successively attributed to the same variable ap-
proach indefinitely a certain fixed value, in such a way as to differ from it by as
little as one wishes, the latter is called the limit of all the others.”
8 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., T.K., S.K., T.M., T. M., D.S., AND D.S.
but provides no evidence in Cauchy’s texts to back up his “standard
interpretation” concerning limits.
3.2. Lu¨tzen versus Laugwitz–Robinson. Lu¨tzen tackles what he
alleges to be a Laugwitz–Robinson interpretation of Cauchy’s infinites-
imals:
Laugwitz and Robinson claim that Cauchy’s variables
not only run through all values that correspond to our
modern real numbers, but also through infinitesimals as
well as sums of real numbers and infinitesimals. . . . I
find such a revaluation [sic] of Cauchy interesting be-
cause it highlights how historians of mathematics un-
consciously read modern post-Weierstrassian ideas into
Cauchy’s work. [74, p. 164]
Lu¨tzen claims that Laugwitz and Robinson “unconsciously read mod-
ern post-Weierstrassian ideas into Cauchy’s work.” To quote a percep-
tive adage of the sages of the Talmud, “kol haposel, bemumo hu posel”
(whoever [seeks to] disqualify [others], it is in his [own] blemish that he
[seeks to] disqualify [them]). As we will see in Section 3.4, it is actually
Lu¨tzen himself who reads post-Weierstrassian notions into Cauchy.
Characteristically, Lu¨tzen does not actually offer any quotes from
either Laugwitz or Robinson to back up his claims. What Lu¨tzen
presents as the Laugwitz–Robinson reading is the idea that Cauchy’s
variable quantities or magnitudes go not merely through ordinary val-
ues but also infinitesimal values.
Lu¨tzen goes on to point out that if the variable quantities already
go through infinitesimal values then there would be no need to define
infinitesimals afterwards as Cauchy does, since they are already in the
picture: “it is hard to explain why infinitesimals are later defined af-
terwards as variable quantities tending to zero” [74, p. 164] (emphasis
in the original) and indeed Cauchy goes on to define infinitesimals only
after discussing variable quantities. QED for Lu¨tzen’s refutation of
Laugwitz–Robinson.
It is not an accident that Lu¨tzen fails actually to quote either Laug-
witz or Robinson on this. In fact, the interpretation he seeks to refute
is due to neither Laugwitz nor Robinson but rather. . . Fisher, who
wrote in 1978:
In the Pre´liminaires to the Cours, Cauchy says: “When
the successive numerical values of the same variable de-
crease indefinitely, in such a way as to fall below any
given number, this variable becomes what one calls an
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infinitely small (un infiniment petit) or an infinitely small
quantity. A variable of this kind has zero for limit” . . .
[37, p. 316]
Fisher concludes as follows:
The first sentence could mean that when the numerical
(i.e., absolute) values of a variable decrease in such a
way as to be less than any positive number, then the
variable takes on infinitesimal values. (ibid.)
Lu¨tzen may be correct in questioning Fisher’s interpretation of Cauchy’s
variables, but Lu¨tzen has not refuted either Laugwitz or Robinson
whom he claims to refute, since such an interpretation is nowhere to
be found in either Laugwitz or Robinson. Lu¨tzen merely introduced
further confusion into the subject, and engaged in regrettable demoni-
sation of Laugwitz and Robinson; cf. Section 7.
Lu¨tzen concludes as follows:
If the nonstandard reading of Cauchy is correct, ‘mag-
nitudes’ should be ordered in a non-Archimedean way
and this clashes with the Euclidean theory. [74, p. 164]
It is not entirely clear what Lu¨tzen means by “Euclidean theory.” If he
means to imply that no non-Archimedean phenomena can be found
in The Elements, this is mostly true, but technically incorrect be-
cause we find discussions of horn angles which violate the Archimedean
property when compared to rectilinear angles. Perhaps by “Euclidean
theory” Lu¨tzen means Property V.4 of The Elements which is closely
related to what we refer today as the Archimedean property. If so,
Lu¨tzen seems to claim that Cauchy would not countenance exploit-
ing infinitesimals which are in blatant violation of “Euclidean theory”
a.k.a. Property V.4. How plausible is such a claim?
Lu¨tzen himself acknowledges that at least Cauchy’s second definition
of continuity does exploit infinitesimals (see Section 3.3) that evidently
“clash[] with the Euclidean theory” a.k.a. V.4. Whether magnitudes
and quantities go through infinitesimal values before or after Cauchy
gets around to defining infinitesimals in terms thereof, there is an ir-
reducible clash with V.4 (and of course Leibniz already pointed out
that infinitesimals violate V.4; see Bascelli et al. [8], Bair et al. [4]).
Lu¨tzen’s allegation that this a shortcoming of what Lu¨tzen refers to as
a “nonstandard reading of Cauchy” is baseless.
In the Robinson–Laugwitz interpretation, Cauchy starts with vari-
able quantities which, as far as the 1821 book is concerned, are se-
quences. Cauchy says that a sequence getting smaller and smaller be-
comes an infinitesimal. Robinson–Laugwitz read this as saying that a
10 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., T.K., S.K., T.M., T. M., D.S., AND D.S.
sequence generates an infinitesimal which can be expressed in modern
mathematical terminology by saying that infinitesimal α is an equiv-
alence class of sequences, but of course Cauchy had neither sets nor
equivalence classes. However, the progression of lemmas and propo-
sitions on polynomials and rational functions in α that Cauchy gives
in the 1821 book does indicate that he is interested in the asymptotic
behavior of the sequence generating an infinitesimal α; see Borovik–
Katz [20] for details. Thus, a change in finitely many terms of the
sequence would not affect the asymptotic behavior. A function f is
applied to an infinitesimal α by evaluating it term-by-term on the
terms of a sequence generating α. Thus, if α is represented by the
sequence (1/n) then the infinitesimal α2 will be incomparably smaller
than alpha and will be represented by the sequence (1/n2).
3.3. Lu¨tzen on Cauchy’s definitions of continuity. Lu¨tzen goes
on to make the following remarkable claim concerning Cauchy’s defini-
tions of continuity:
Cauchy actually gives two definitions, first one without
infinitesimals and then one using infinitesimals. . . . The
first definition very clearly specifies a value of the vari-
able x and states that f(x + α) − f(x) tends to zero
with α. [74, p. 166].
Lu¨tzen’s claim is puzzling all the more so since Cauchy’s definitions are
conveniently reproduced in Lu¨tzen’s own text, and Cauchy clearly de-
scribes his α as “an infinitely small increase” [74, p. 159]. It is therefore
difficult, though not impossible (see below), to maintain as Lu¨tzen does
that Cauchy’s first definition was “without infinitesimals.” Cauchy’s
second definition is even more straightforward in exploiting an infinitely
small increase α:
[Cauchy’s second definition] the function f(x) will re-
main continuous with respect to x between the given lim-
its if, between these limits an infinitely small increase
[i.e., α] in the variable always produces an infinitely
small increase in the function itself. [74, p. 160] (em-
phasis in the original)
The reason we wrote above that it is difficult though not impossible
to maintain as Lu¨tzen does that Cauchy’s first definition is “without
infinitesimals” is because of the possibility of falling back on a Weier-
strassian interpretation of Cauchy’s infinitesimal α in terms of either
sequences or ghosts of departed quantifiers, as other historians have
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done. But if it is Lu¨tzen’s intention that Cauchy’s α is only a place-
holder for reassuringly Weierstrassian things, then what are we to make
of Lu¨tzen’s acknowledgment on page 166 (cited above) that Cauchy’s
second definition does exploit infinitesimals? Apparently the same in-
finitesimal α is used in both definitions, and if α were only a placeholder
in the first definition, then α would be a mere placeholder in the sec-
ond definition, as well. Either way you look at it, Lu¨tzen’s reading of
Cauchy’s definitions of continuity is problematic.
At any rate we wholeheartedly agree with Lu¨tzen’s assessment that
Cauchy’s second definition of continuity quoted above does exploit in-
finitesimals. If so, then Lu¨tzen would apparently have to agree with
us that classical modern analysis in a Weierstrassian framework is not
necessarily the best starting point for understanding at least some of
Cauchy’s procedures, and therefore should not necessarily serve as a
primary point of reference when interpreting Cauchy’s second defini-
tion of continuity, contrary to Fraser’s stated position; see Sections 4
through 7.
3.4. Did Cauchy need Dedekind? In this Section we examine the
following startlingly ahistorical claim by Lu¨tzen:
In modern treatment [the convergence of a Cauchy se-
quence] is derived from the completeness of the real
numbers (or is even taken as the definition of complete-
ness) which must be either postulated as an axiom or ob-
tained from a construction of the real numbers. Cauchy’s
work does not contain either way out and he could not
have appealed to the underlying concept of magnitude
because Euclid does not have axioms which ensure the
completeness of his magnitudes.
This missing account of completeness is a fundamental
lacuna which appears in several other places in Cauchy’s
analysis, in particular in his proof of the intermediate
value theorem. . . [74, p. 167-168] (emphasis added)
According to Lu¨tzen, it is a “fundamental lacuna” of Cauchy’s proof
of intermediate value theorem that the result relies on completeness
and completeness could not have been provided by Cauchy. Why is
that? Says Lu¨tzen, because there are two ways of doing that: either
axiomatic or construction. Lu¨tzen claims that Cauchy did not have a
construction, and as far as axioms go, Euclid did not have anything on
completeness.
12 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., T.K., S.K., T.M., T. M., D.S., AND D.S.
However, Lu¨tzen’a analysis is misleading not merely because Simon
Stevin already gave us unending decimals centuries earlier, but also be-
cause Laugwitz explicitly points out in his papers (see e.g., [71, p. 202])
that Cauchy did not need a construction of the reals because he had
unending decimal expansions.
Cauchy’s argument for finding a zero of a continuous function that
changes sign works because it gives a procedure for finding an unending
decimal expansion of such a zero, without hifalutin’ embellishments
concerning completeness, which is certainly a useful notion but was
only introduced by Dedekind half a century later.
Thus, in the context of unending decimals Cauchy did have a suitable
construction (contrary to Lu¨tzen’s claim concerning an alleged funda-
mental lacuna) especially if one uses recursive subdivision into 10 equal
parts as Stevin had done, which would directly produce an unending
decimal expansion of a required zero of the function; see B laszczyk et
al. [15, Section 2.3] for details.
The Whig history aspect of Lu¨tzen’s analysis is ironic since this is
precisely the shortcoming he seeks to pin on Robinson and Laugwitz;
see Section 3.2.
Without proposing any textual analysis of Cauchy’s proof, Lu¨tzen
concludes, apparently on the grounds of historical hindsight deduced
from Dedekind backwards, that Cauchy’s proof could not possibly be
correct, because Dedekind hand’t clarified the relevant mathematical
notion of completeness yet. But, as we saw, Cauchy did not need
Dedekind simply because the assertion (or tacit assumption) that each
unending decimal results in a legitimate real number (1) is equivalent
to the completeness, and furthermore (2) could hardly be questioned by
any sound pre-Weierstrassian analyst. The axiomatic formalisation of
completeness was not a dramatic new discovery but rather a workhorse
systematisation of common views in a new revolutionary language.
4. Role of modern theories
The relevance of modern theories to interpreting the mathematics
of the past is a knotty issue that has caused much ink to be spilled.
Without attempting to resolve it, we offer the following thoughts to
help clarify the issue.
4.1. On the relevance of theories for history of mathematics.
Let us begin by considering, as a thought experiment, the following
passage.
(B) The relevance of modern Archimedean theories to
an historical appreciation of the early calculus is a moot
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point. It is doubtful if it is possible or advisable to recon-
struct a past mathematical subject in a way that con-
forms to modern theories and is also consistent with how
a practitioner of the period would have worked. Such
a project runs the obvious risk of imposing one’s own
interests and conceptions on the past subject. It is pos-
sible that such an endeavor will end up with something
of intellectual interest and mathematical value, but it is
unlikely that it will constitute a significant contribution
to history.
The source of the passage (B) will be identified below. For the time be-
ing we note the following. The passage amounts to a sweeping dismissal
of the modern, punctiform, Archimedean framework (as developed by
Cantor, Dedekind, Weierstrass and others) as a primary point of refer-
ence for historical work dealing with prior centuries.
A reader might react with puzzlement to such a sweeping dismissal,
feeling that the grounds for it are too generic to be convincing. Granted
the punctiform nature of the modern continuum is different from the
historical views of the continuum as found for example in Leibniz, Eu-
ler, and Cauchy.6 However, the reader may feel that the passage above
ends up throwing out the baby with the (punctiform) bathwater.
To avoid such an overreaction one may argue as follows. For all the
set-theoretic novelty of the modern view of the Archimedean contin-
uum, surely important insight is to be gained from modern axiomati-
sations of the procedures in Euclid’s Elements, resulting in a greater
appreciation, and understanding, of this classical work (on Euclid see
further in Section 5).
Similarly, historians have often endeavored to show how the lucid-
ity of the modern Archimedean limit concept serves as a benchmark
that allows us to appreciate the progress being made over the decades
and centuries in clarifying the nature of the procedures involving this
concept that were employed in the 17th through the 19th centuries in
solving problems of analysis.
To save the baby, the reader may feel that a distinction needs to be
made between, on the one hand, the modern set-theoretic justification
of the entities involved, such as that of the complete Archimedean or-
dered field; and, on the other, the procedures and inferential moves ex-
ploited in mathematical arguments, as already discussed in Section 2.2.
The former (set-theoretic justification) pertains to the domain of the
6For a study of Stevin, see Katz–Katz [61] and B laszczyk et al. [15, Section 2]; for
Fermat, see Katz et al. [64] and Bair et al. [5]; for Gregory, see Bascelli et al. [9].
14 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., T.K., S.K., T.M., T. M., D.S., AND D.S.
ontology of mathematical entities that apparently had little historical
counterpart prior to 1870. Meanwhile, the latter (procedures) are, on
the contrary, indispensable tools that allow us to clarify and appreciate
the inferential moves as found in the work of the mathematicians of the
past.
The distinction between procedure and ontology is a tool implicitly
used in [40] (see Section 6.1). Similarly, Ferraro and Panza, both short-
listed in [40, p. 27] among the authorities on the 18th century, declare
a failure of Lagrange’s program of founding analysis on power series in
the following terms:
[Lagrange’s books] are part of a foundationalist agenda.
The fact that this agenda was never really accepted by
Lagrange’s contemporaries contrasts with another fact:
that it was the most careful attempt to integrate the cal-
culus within the program of 18th-century algebraic anal-
ysis. Its failure is then also the failure of this ambitious
program. [36, p. 189, Conclusions] (emphasis added)
One might ask, in what sense did Lagrange’s program fail, if not in the
modern sense of being unable to account for non-analytic functions?
When restricted to analytic ones, Lagrange’s program indeed succeeds.
Ferraro and Panza focus on Lagrange’s purity of the method but ul-
timately use a modern yardstick to offer an evaluation (namely, an
alleged failure) of Lagrange’s program, without necessarily falling into
a presentist trap of attributing a punctiform continuum to Lagrange.
We hasten to add that the passage (B) cited at the beginning of
the current Section 4.1 is Fraser’s only up to a single, but very sig-
nificant, modification. We changed his adjective non-Archimedean to
Archimedean. Fraser’s original passage reads as follows.
4.2. Fraser’s original passage. (A) “The relevance of modern non-
Archimedean theories to an historical appreciation of the early calculus
is a moot point. It is doubtful if it is possible or advisable to reconstruct
a past mathematical subject in a way that conforms to modern theories
and is also consistent with how a practitioner of the period would have
worked. Such a project runs the obvious risk of imposing one’s own
interests and conceptions on the past subject. It is possible that such
an endeavor will end up with something of intellectual interest and
mathematical value, but it is unlikely that it will constitute a significant
contribution to history.” [40, p. 43].
4.3. Analysis of Fraser’s original. Fraser’s original passage (A) ap-
pearing in Section 4.2 amounts to a sweeping dismissal of the modern
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non-Archimedean framework as developed by Robinson, Laugwitz, and
others as a primary point of historical reference.
Again, the reader might react with puzzlement to such a sweep-
ing dismissal on what appear to be excessively generic grounds. The
reader might object to Fraser’s throwing out the baby with the (set-
theoretic) bathwater when he ignores the distinction between modern
foundational justification and classical procedures.
The upshot of our thought experiment should be clear by now.
For Fraser, neither the modern Archimedean nor the modern non-
Archimedean theories should be relevant to a historical appreciation
of the early calculus. Rather, for him, history of mathematics stands
alone and aloof. As a result it risks becoming, one may say, a vain (in
both senses) exercise of “l’Histoire, c’est Moi” type; see Katz [62].
In his passage (A), Fraser implicitly argues in favor of a splendid
isolation for a historiography of mathematics; according to him, it
is to be pursued independently of any influence coming from modern
mathematical theories whatsoever, whether of the Archimedean or the
Bernoullian variety. This naturally extends to a claim that history of
mathematics should be pursued independently of any theoretical mod-
ern influences whatsoever: after all, modern mathematics comes along
with, like it or not, a lot of ideological baggage concerning problems of
what mathematics is, how it is related to other sciences, etc.
Yet the contention that one’s own conception of the history of math-
ematics would be free of any such baggage is hardly convincing (see
especially Fraser’s remarks on classical analysis as a “primary point
of reference” analyzed in Section 4.6). Thus, replacing the somewhat
unfriendly expression ideological baggage by the more neutral term phi-
losophy we may assert that Fraser’s intended isolationism amounts to
a history of mathematics without philosophy of mathematics.
While we cautiously subscribe to Lakatos’s dictum concerning the
dependence of history of science on philosophy of science,7 we don’t
subscribe to the way in which he applied it to the history of the early
calculus, preferring Laugwitz’s analysis as developed in the pages of
Historia Mathematica [70], Archive for History of Exact Sciences [71],
and elsewhere.
As philosopher Marx Wartofsky pointed out in his programmatic
contribution The Relation between Philosophy of Science and History
of Science [102], there are many distinct possible relations between
philosophy of science and history of science, some “more agreeable”
7Lakatos’s insight as formulated in [69] was grounded upon earlier historical-
philosophical studies such as Hesse [51].
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and fruitful than others (ibid., p. 719ff). We need not go into the
details of Wartofsky’s typology of possible relations between the two
disciplines. It will suffice to point out that according to him a fruitful
relation between history and philosophy of science requires a rich and
complex ontology of that science.
In the case of mathematics, this means that a fruitful relation be-
tween history and philosophy must go beyond offering an ontology of
the domain over which a certain piece of mathematics ranges (say, num-
bers, functions, sets, infinitesimals, structures, or whatever). Namely,
it must develop the ontology of mathematics as a scientific theory itself
(ibid., p. 723).
In the present article, we make a step in this direction by distinguish-
ing between the (historically relative) ontology of the mathematical
objects in a certain historical setting, and its procedures, particularly
emphasizing the different roles these components play in the history of
mathematics. More precisely, our procedures serve as a representative
of what Wartofsky called the praxis characteristic of the mathematics
of a certain time period, and our ontology takes care of the mathemat-
ical objects recognized at that time.
The urgency of drawing attention away from mathematical founda-
tions (in a narrow ontological sense) and toward practice was expressed
by Lawvere:
In my own education I was fortunate to have two teach-
ers who used the term ‘foundations’ in a common-sense
way (rather than in the speculative way of the Bolzano–
Frege–Peano–Russell tradition). This way is exempli-
fied by their work in Foundations of Algebraic Topology,
published in 1952 by Eilenberg (with Steenrod), and
The Mechanical Foundations of Elasticity and Fluid Me-
chanics, published in the same year by Truesdell. The
orientation of these works seemed to be ‘concentrate the
essence of practice and in turn use the result to guide
practice.’ [72, p. 213]
Related educational issues were analyzed by Katz–Polev [63].
Our thought experiment in Section 4.1 comparing the passages (B)
and (A) helps highlight the problem with Fraser’s argument. Fraser
attempts to argue against using modern Bernoullian frameworks (see
Section 2.1) to interpret the mathematics of the past, but fails to take
into account the crucial distinction between procedure and ontology.
Therefore his argument in favor of dismissing modern frameworks is so
general as to apply to his own work, and indeed to much valuable work
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on understanding the mathematics of the past, and has the effect of
so to speak throwing out the (procedural) baby with the (ontological)
bathwater. He wishes to reject applications of Bernoullian frameworks
to procedures of the mathematics of the past while ignoring much of
the evidence, and on such generic grounds as to make his critique un-
tenable.
4.4. A conceptual gulf. A failure to keep in mind crucial distinctions
such as that between procedure and ontology undermines Fraser’s eval-
uation of Robinson’s historical work. Writes Fraser:
The transition from algebraic analysis of the eighteenth
century to Cauchy–Weierstrass analysis of the nineteenth
century marked a much greater discontinuity than did
the emergence of nonstandard analysis out of classical
analysis in the second half of the twentieth century. [40,
p. 42]
This is a valid remark (particularly if one omits the mention of Cauchy)
on the nature of post-Weierstrassian analysis, and one consistent with
our comments on the ontology of punctiform continua in Section 2.
Fraser continues:
Nonstandard analysis is an offshoot of modern analysis
and sits solidly on the modern side of the conceptual
gulf opened up by the Cauchy–Weierstrass foundation.
(ibid.)
Fraser again makes a valid point (again modulo Cauchy’s role) concern-
ing the ontology underwriting mathematical entities since Weierstrass.
But then Fraser makes the following leap:
In this respect Robinson and to a lesser degree Lakatos
were mistaken in their assessment of Cauchy. (ibid.)
This remark of Fraser’s is a non-sequitur exacerbated by Fraser’s failure
to make explicit the alleged mistakes of Robinson and Lakatos. The
following comment by Robinson already quoted in Section 2.2 may help
set the record straight:
. . . from a formalist point of view we may look at our the-
ory syntactically and may consider that what we have
done is to introduce new deductive procedures rather
than new mathematical entities. [82, p. 282] (empha-
sis in the original)
Nor does Fraser provide any detailed examination of Robinson’s analy-
sis of Cauchyan texts (though a brief summary appears in [40, p. 26]).
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In what respect exactly is Robinson allegedly “mistaken in [his] assess-
ment of Cauchy” as Fraser claims?
Following on the heels of Fraser’s comments on the conceptual gulf
wrought by set-theoretic foundations that emerged following the work
of Weierstrass, Fraser’s remark derives its impetus from the modern
nature of Robinson’s framework based as it is on punctiform models
of continua, contrary to pre-1870 work which was generally not based
on such ontology. Yet Fraser fails to take into account the fact that in
discussing Cauchy, Robinson is talking procedure, not ontology.8
4.5. Who took Cauchy out of his historical milieu? Having sum-
marily dismissed Robinson, Fraser goes on to yet another non-sequitur:
Rather than try to understand Cauchy as someone who
developed within a given intellectual and historical mi-
lieu, they approach the history from an essentially arti-
ficial point of view. [40, p. 42]
Fraser provides no evidence for his claim that Robinson seeks to take
Cauchy out of his historical milieu. One may well wonder whether, on
the contrary, it is Fraser who seeks to take Cauchy out of his historical
milieu. Indeed, Robinson takes Cauchy’s infinitely small at (proce-
dural) face value based on an assumption that Cauchy understood the
term in a sense common among his contemporaries like Abel and Pois-
son, as well as a majority of his colleagues at the Ecole Polytechnique,
both mathematicians and physicists, whose work was a natural habitat
for infinitesimals, as documented by Gilain [42].
Meanwhile, by postulating a so-called Cauchy–Weierstrass founda-
tion (see Section 4.4), Fraser precisely yanks Cauchy right out of his his-
torical milieu, and inserts him in the heroic 1870s alongside C. Boyer’s
great triumvirate.9
Robinson was one of the first to express the sentiment that the A-
framework is inadequate to account for Cauchy’s infinitesimal mathe-
matics. Grattan-Guinness points out that Cauchy’s proof of the sum
8It is worth mentioning that, among other sources, Robinson’s work grew from a re-
flection upon Skolem’s nonstandard models of arithmetic. These were developed in
[90], [91], [92]. Skolem represents his nonstandard numbers by definable sequences
of integers (the standard numbers being represented by constant sequences). A
sequence that tends to infinity generates an infinite number. This procedure bears
analogy to Cauchy’s representation of the B-continuum. Indeed, Cauchy gives an
example of a variable quantity as a sequence at the start of his Cours d’Analyse [23].
9Historian Carl Boyer described Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass as the great
triumvirate in [22, p. 298]. The term serves as a humorous characterisation of both
A-track scholars and their objects of adulation.
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theorem is difficult to interpret in an Archimedean framework, due to
Cauchy’s use of infinitesimals. Thus, Grattan-Guinness wrote:
This remark [of Cauchy’s] is difficult to interpret against
[i.e., in the context of] the classification of modes of
uniform convergence given here . . . since α is an in-
finitesimally small increment of x. [45, p. 122] (emphasis
added)
Recent studies by Nakane [77] and Sørensen [93] have emphasized the
difference between Cauchyan and Weierstrassian notions of limit.
Meanwhile, a B-track framework enables a better understanding of
Cauchy’s procedures in his 1853 text on the convergence of series of
functions [28] (see Bascelli et al. [10] for a detailed analysis) and other
texts where infinitesimals are used in an essential fashion, such as
Cauchy’s seminal 1832 text on geometric probability [26] and his sem-
inal 1823 text on the theory of elasticity [25]. Fraser’s misjudgment of
Cauchy’s historical role is a predictable consequence of his dogmatic
endorsement of A-track analysis as the primary point of reference for
understanding the mathematics of the past, as we discuss in Section 4.6.
4.6. The apple of discord. Fraser seeks to distance himself from
Boyer’s view of the history of analysis as inevitable progress toward
arithmetisation:
Since the 1960s there has been a new wave of writ-
ing about the history of eighteenth-century mathematics
[that has] charted the development of calculus without
interpreting this development as a first stage in the in-
evitable evolution of an arithmetic foundation. (Fraser
[40, p. 27])
However, the following passage from Fraser’s survey reveals the nature
of his misconception:
Of course, classical analysis developed out of the older
subject and it remains a primary point of reference for
understanding the eighteenth-century theories. By con-
trast, nonstandard analysis and other non-Archimedean
versions of calculus emerged only fairly recently in some-
what abstruse mathematical settings that bear little con-
nection to the historical developments one and a half,
two or three centuries earlier. (ibid.; emphasis added)
For all his attempts to distance himself from Boyer’s idolisation of
the triumvirate,10 Fraser here commits himself to a position similar
10See note 9 on page 18 for an explanation of the term.
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to Boyer’s. Namely, Fraser claims that modern punctiform A-track
analysis is, “of course, [!] a primary point of reference” for understand-
ing the analysis of the past. His sentiment that modern punctiform
B-track analysis bears little connection to the historical developments
ignores the procedure versus ontology dichotomy.
Arguably, modern infinitesimal analysis provides better proxies for
the procedures of the calculus of the founders, based as it was on a fun-
damental Leibnizian distinction between assignable and inassignable
quantities11 underpinning the infinitesimal analysis of the 17th and
18th centuries, as analyzed in B laszczyk et al. [17]. Meanwhile scholars
since Ishiguro [55, Chapter 5] have been engaged in a syncategorematic
quest for ghosts of departed quantifiers in Leibniz.
A sentiment of the inevitability of classical analysis is expressed by
Fraser who feels that “classical analysis developed out of the older sub-
ject and it remains a primary point of reference for understanding the
eighteenth-century theories” (ibid.); yet his very formulation involves
circular reasoning. It is only if one takes classical analysis as a primary
point of reference that it becomes plausible to conclude that it devel-
oped out of the older subject (and therefore should serve as a primary
point of reference).
To comment on Ian Hacking’s distinction between the butterfly model
and the Latin model, we note the contrast between a model of a de-
terministic biological development of animals such as butterflies, as
opposed to a model of a contingent historical evolution of languages
such as Latin.
If one allows, with Ian Hacking [47, pp. 72–75], for the possibility of
alternative courses for the development of analysis (a Latin model as
opposed to a butterfly model), Fraser’s assumption that the historical
development necessarily led to modern classical analysis (as formalized
by Weierstrass and others) remains an unsupported hypothesis.
The butterfly model assumes a teleological or culminationist view
of mathematical development, in which the texts of historical mathe-
maticians are interpreted in terms of their location on the track that
inevitably culminates in our current dominant formal understanding of
analysis. In contrast, the Latin model treats some aspects of mathe-
matical development as contingent rather than inevitable.
11The distinction goes back to the work of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), which
also inspired Galilio’s distinction between quanta and non-quanta according to
Knobloch [67].
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By distinguishing A-track from B-track development, we are not
therefore proposing a butterfly model, just with two possible butter-
flies at the end. Rather, we are noting that it is an illusion that one
can interpret historical mathematics without the interpretation being
informed by philosophical commitments or mathematical frameworks.
Fraser and others we have referenced in this paper have not applied a
framework-free interpretation of the works of mathematicians such as
Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy. They have, consciously or unconsciously,
employed an A-track or Weierstrassian framework. By focusing atten-
tion on mathematical procedure rather than ontology, we can see that
a B-track framework reveals aspects of these great mathematicians’
work that A-track analyses distort or dismiss. The B-track analysis
also provides an alternative to the claustrophobic presumption that
mathematical development is pre-scripted or determined.
We will respond to Fraser’s little connection claim in more detail in
Section 5.
5. Euclid
In this section we will respond more fully to Fraser’s passage quoted
in Section 4.6.
5.1. History and ‘little connection’. Since 1870, both non-Archime-
dean analysis and non-Archimedean geometry have developed in paral-
lel to classical analysis. Here one could mention the work of Otto Stolz
and Paul du Bois-Reymond in analysis, and that of Giuseppe Veronese
and David Hilbert in geometry; see Ehrlich [31].
Hermann Hankel developed the first modern interpretation of Book V
of Euclid’s Elements in his 1876 work [48]. In this way he initiated
mathematical investigations of the notion of magnitude carried out fur-
ther by Stolz, Du Bois-Reymond, H. Weber, and O. Ho¨lder; for details
see B laszczyk [13].
This line of investigation culminated in 1899/1903 with the first and
second editions of Grundlagen der Geometrie, when Hilbert pioneered
an axiom system for an ordered field; see Hilbert [53], [54]. With
his axiomatic method, Hilbert initiated a new type of investigation of
a foundational type in geometry. However, Hilbert also initiated an
axiomatic study of the real numbers, which is a lesser-known aspect of
his work. Such new investigations focus, on the one hand, on axiomatic
characterisations of mathematical structures, and on the other, on the
descriptive power of formal languages.
As regards the real numbers, foundational studies were carried out,
among others, by E. V. Huntington and O. Veblen, at the beginning of
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the 20th century. In 1926 Artin and Schreier [2] and in 1931 Tarski [99]
developed the theory of real-closed fields. Robinson explicitly referred
to the “theory of formally-real fields of Artin and Schreier” in [82,
p. 278]. Robinson’s framework for infinitesimal analysis inscribes in
the tradition of foundational studies of the real numbers.
Hilbert’s foundational studies in geometry are well-known. While
his Grundlagen der Geometrie is primarily a mathematical book, it is
referred to both by mathematicians studying the foundations of Eu-
clidean geometry and by historians interpreting Euclid’s geometry; see
e.g., Heath [50], Mueller [76]. Historians of Greek mathematics of-
ten rely on modern interpretive techniques. Thus Netz [78] refers to
cognitive science and Kuhn’s philosophy. Naturally also refer to the
achievements of modern mathematics.
Now, a given historian’s competence and the limitations of the math-
ematical techniques he learned, tend to determine what portion of con-
temporary mathematics he is able to apply in his historical studies.12
This applies even to the history of Greek mathematics, where the dis-
tance between the source text we refer to and mathematical techniques
we apply in our interpretation is measured in thousands of years, as
compared to hundreds in the case of infinitesimal calculus. In the next
two sections we will provide some examples.
5.2. Applying modern mathematics to interpreting Euclid. The
very first proposition of Euclid’s Elements is controversial as it relies
on the assumption that two circles occurring in its proof must meet.
Almost every commentator from Proclus to Mueller comments on this
assumption. Already in the 1645 Claude Richard [81] realized that an
additional hypothesis is required here; see de Risi [30, section 1.2].
5.2.1. Hilbert’s axioms. Heath claimed that one “must invoke” the con-
tinuity axiom to fill this logical gap in Euclid’s proof [50, vol. 1, p. 242].
However, interpretaters of Euclid’s Elements following Hilbert’sGrund-
lagen der Geometrie showed that in place of the continuity axiom, it
is sufficient to invoke the so-called Pasch axiom and circle-circle inter-
section property, and then Euclid’s geometry, as developed in Books
1–4, can be developed in a plane without the continuity axiom; see
Hartshorne [49, p. 110].
Furthermore, the Pasch axiom can be derived from the fact that the
field of segments is a Pythagorean field, i.e., a field closed under the
operation
√
1 + a2; see [49, p. 187].
12Such limitations are presumably what prompts a historian to describe a given
piece of mathematics as abstruse; see Section 4.6 and Section 8.
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5.2.2. Modern axiomatic systems. Modern axiomatic systems that fol-
lowed, do not appeal explicitly to the notion of a circle. Instead, they
encode the circle-circle intersection property in some axioms which ap-
ply relations of congruence, betweenness, and equal distance. Thus,
Karol Borsuk and Wanda Szmielew modified Hilbert axiom system,
and showed that Euclid’s geometry can be developed based on axioms
of incidence, congruence, equal distance and order, including the Pasch
axiom, without the continuity axiom; see [21, § 93].
5.2.3. Tarski’s axioms. In 1959 Alfred Tarski [100] obtained further
results using a system of axioms he developed. This system can be for-
mulated in first order logic and enables one to translate some metageo-
metrical results into ordered field terms. Thus, it turns out that models
of Euclidean geometry coincide (up to isomorphism) with Cartesian
planes over a Euclidean field, i.e., an ordered field closed under the
square root operation.
In 1974 Szmielew [97] showed that models of geometry satisfying the
Pasch axiom coincide (up to isomorphism) with a Cartesian plane over
a Pythagorean field. The so called two-circles axiom13 provides the
geometric analog for the Euclidean field property. Furthermore,
(1) the Pasch axiom is a consequence of the circle axiom;
(2) the Pasch axiom does not follow from the continuity axiom, and
(3) the circle axiom indeed follows from the continuity axiom;
see respectively Szmielew [95], Szmielew [96], and Szczerba [94]. With
regard to this somewhat paradoxical situation, Szmielew commented as
follows: “At the first glance the situation seem to be paradoxical, since
it is common to say that C [the circle axiom] is a particular consequence
of Co [the continuity axiom]. In fact, C can not be proved without the
use of Co, however, in the proof of C besides Co also some other axioms
of E [Euclidean geometry] are involved” [96, p. 751].
Relating modern axioms, on the one hand, to Euclid’s axioms, pos-
tulates and theorems, on the other, constitutes a methodological chal-
lenge since that there is no explicit counterpart of betweenness rela-
tion in Euclid’s geometry. Nonetheless, such metageometrical results
13The circle axiom asserts that B(abc)⇒ (∃c′)[B(pbc′)∧D(ac′ac)]. The two circles
axiom asserts that
M(ac′b) ∧M(ab′c) ∧M(ba′c)⇒ (∃q)[L(pc′q) ∧ (D(qb′ab′) ∨D(qa′ba′))],
where M(abc) means that b is the midpoint, i.e., lies between a and c, and D(abbc)
while L is the colinearity relation, B is the betweenness relation, and D is the equal
distance relation.
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arguably contribute both to our interpretation and appreciation of Eu-
clid’s Elements and to the book’s historical perception, by enabling
new interpretive perspectives, be it logical gaps in Euclid’s develop-
ment or the role of diagrams in his proofs. This is contrary to Fraser’s
contention that analysis of historical texts that relies on modern math-
ematics cannot produce a significant contribution to history. While
this methodology is widely accepted, it differs from the one we apply
only in the scope of modern mathematics being employed.
5.3. Applying modern mathematics to the real numbers. Our
next example concerns the real numbers. In light of the foundational
studies mentioned above, we have today not only different versions of
the continuity axiom but also some independence results. We know,
for example, that continuity of real numbers can be characterized by
the Dedekind axiom (i.e., no Dedekind cut gives a gap) or equivalently
by the conjunction of two conditions: Cauchy completeness (CC) and
the Archimedean axiom (AA). It is known that axioms CC and AA
are independent, since both the hyperreals and Levi-Civita fields are
non-Archimedean but Cauchy-complete.
With this knowledge we now consider the historical texts. In 1872
neither Cantor, Dedekind, Heine, or Me´ray were aware of AA. However,
while Dedekind characterized the real numbers by his axiom (and from
the current perspective it is a correct characterisation), Cantor, as well
as Me´ray and Heine, characterized real numbers by means of CC alone.
Can we then claim that they (i.e., Cantor, Heine, and Me´ray) really
knew what real numbers are? Apparently not.
Furthermore, while Cauchy sequences, or Fundamentalreihen, were
widely in use at the time, Dedekind’s axiom by no means bears any
connection to historical developments that preceded Stetigkeit und ir-
rationale Zahlen.
To give a further example, the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT) is
another equivalent form of the the Dedekind Cut Axiom; see Teismann
[101, section 3], and B laszczyk [14, note 5]. This relates to the famous
Bolzano proof of the IVT [19]. Bolzano had no access to axiomatic
characterisations of the real numbers. Should this modern result be
employed in analyzing Bolzano’s pamphlet? We argue that the answer
is affirmative, as this result suggests a new interpretive perspective of
seeking another version of the continuity axiom that he implicitly used
in his proof.
As far as Robinson’s framework is concerned, we have shown that,
from a historical perspective, it belongs squarely in the tradition of
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foundational studies of the real numbers. However, Robinson’s frame-
work also sheds new light on the relation of being infinitely close, as well
as on infinite (or in modern terminology, hyperfinite) sums and prod-
ucts (see Section 6.6). Therefore Robinson’s framework can be usefully
applied in historiography on a par with Hilbert’s axiomatic method
and the results it provides, beyond the strictures of a Weierstrassian
framework useful though it may be.
6. From general to the specific
In addition to general claims concerning an alleged a priori inappli-
cability of Bernoullian frameworks to historical research as analyzed
in Section 4, Fraser’s article contains some specific claims concerning
Robinson’s framework. We will analyze one such claim in this section.
6.1. Algorithms. As we mentioned in Section 4, Fraser himself im-
plicitly relies on the dichotomy of procedure versus ontology. Thus, he
writes:
Two of the most prominent features of the early calcu-
lus – the tension between analytic and geometric modes
of representation and the central place occupied by the
algorithm – are not reproduced at all in nonstandard
analysis as defining characteristics of the subject. [40,
p. 39] (emphasis added)
We will examine the “tensions” mentioned by Fraser on another occa-
sion. What interests us here is Fraser’s claim concerning “the central
place occupied by the algorithm.” Now algorithmic aspects clearly fall
under the rubric of procedures as opposed to ontology (see Section 2.2).
Focus on algorithms certainly characterized 18th century mathematics.
We will examine Fraser’s claim that they allegedly “are not reproduced
at all in nonstandard analysis” in Section 6.3.
6.2. Fraser, algebraic analysis, and the details. Fraser argues
that infinitesimals and the familiar foundational issues surrounding
them were not the primary motivators of the evolution of analysis.
He further claims that the bulk of 19th-century work responded to the
context of the algebraic-analytic approach exemplified by Lagrange, in
which infinitesimals already played a secondary role:
The question of the logical status of infinitesimals is of
secondary interest, from either the perspective of a re-
searcher in the early eighteenth century or an observer
today. The second topic concerns the decisive shift to
algebraic analysis that occurred in the writings of such
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figures as Euler and Lagrange in the second half of the
century. [40, p. 28] (emphasis added)
Fraser continues:
The French philosopher Auguste Comte . . . revered La-
grange and believed that he had brought mathematics to
an almost completed state. . . In this conception ques-
tions about the status of infinitesimals or the meaning
of imaginary numbers were very much secondary, and
the primary emphasis was on operations, functions, re-
lations and the active process of working to solutions.
[40, p. 37]
While initially plausible, this thesis dissolves under closer scrutiny of
the actual details. The plausibility of Fraser’s thesis hinges on equiv-
ocation on the meaning of the term algebraic used by Fraser. What
exactly is meant by Lagrange’s algebraic approach? One can envision
the following three possibilities for the meaning of this term:
(1) Lagrange’s approach to function theory based on power series
expansion;
(2) the principle of the so-called generality of algebra extensively
relied upon by Lagrange following his predecessors;
(3) the algebraic foundations for analysis as initiated in Euler’s In-
troductio [33].
Item (1) will not do since Cauchy extensively deals with nonanalytic
functions. Thus, (1) is not plausible as a general description of 19th
century work, since it leaves out Cauchy, who certainly was an impor-
tant figure for 19th century analysis.
Item (2), rather than being the context of Cauchy’s work, was on
the contrary the main source of his dissatisfaction with Lagrange, as
detailed in the introduction to Cauchy’s Cours d’Analyse [23].
This leaves us with (3) Euler’s Introductio and subsequent work by
Lagrange and others. Fraser’s assumption of a clean separation be-
tween algebra and infinitesimals may be compatible with modern usage,
but it is an anachronistic way of reading Euler’s work where algebraic
manipulations with infinitesimals were ubiquitous; for details see Bas-
celli et al. [8]. In fact, Lagrange himself eventually came to embrace
infinitesimals in the second edition of his Me´canique Analytique; see
Katz–Katz [59].
Thus, Euler’s work can be viewed as an algebraic approach dealing
with algebraic manipulations of infinitesimal and non-infinitesimal en-
tities alike. Hence (3) is not a compelling argument that infinitesimals
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only played a minor role. The actual details are not kind to Fraser’s
thesis.
6.3. Fraser, hyperreal analysis, and the details. Formulating as-
sertions concerning a mathematical theory would require that a scholar
possess a basic level of competence with regard to the theory, particu-
larly if he seeks to base sweeping historical conclusions on such claims.
In this section we will examine the level of Fraser’s competence in the
matter of the hyperreals.
In his discussion of the hyperreals, Fraser finally provides some de-
tails while attempting to summarize Robinson’s construction of the hy-
perreals via the compactness theorem applied to a suitable languageK.
What is alarming is that Fraser [40, p. 25] specifically describes his
collection K as consisting of sentences of the form c < v for each c ∈ R
(and no other sentences) in order to force an infinite v in the model.
Earlier in that paragraph, Fraser does comment on a “formalized lan-
guage that is rich enough to formulate all sentences that are true in
the real numbers R,” but this comment is not used in any way in his
definition of K (and furthermore contains a crucial inaccuracy: trans-
fer applies to first-order sentences only, not to all sentences as Fraser
claims). Now any proper ordered field extension of R will satisfy the
sentences of Fraser’s collection K, for example the field of rational func-
tions ordered by the behavior of the function at infinity (i.e., a suitable
lexicographic order).
Neither the compactness theorem nor hifalutin’ mathematical logic
are required to build a proper ordered field extension of R. Thus Fraser
entirely misses the point of the hyperreals as the only extension pos-
sessing a full transfer principle (see Section 6.4). The transfer principle
connects procedurally to Leibniz’s Law of continuity. Leibniz’s the-
oretical strategy in dealing with infinitesimals was analyzed in Katz–
Sherry [65], Sherry–Katz [88], Bascelli et al. [8], B laszczyk et al. [16], as
well as the study by Bair et al. [3] that Fraser is reacting to. Leibniz’s
theoretical strategy was arguably more robust than George Berkeley’s
flawed critique thereof.
We therefore cannot agree with Fraser’s claim to the effect that Leib-
niz allegedly “never developed a coherent theoretical strategy to deal
with [infinitesimals]” in [40, p. 31]. Fraser’s attitude toward Leibniz’s
theoretical strategy in dealing with infinitesimals is surely a function of
his dismissive attitude toward B-track historiography in general, which
would similarly account for a failure to appreciate the import of Robin-
son’s extension.
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6.4. Transfer principle. The transfer principle is a type of theorem
that, depending on the context, asserts that rules, laws or procedures
valid for a certain number system, still apply (i.e., are “transfered”)
to an extended number system. Thus, the familiar extension Q →֒ R
preserves the property of being an ordered field. To give a negative
example, the extension R →֒ R ∪ {±∞} of the real numbers to the
so-called extended reals does not preserve the property of being an
ordered field. The hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R preserves all first-order
properties, e.g., the formula sin2 x+cos2 x = 1 (valid for all hyperreal x,
including infinitesimal and infinite values of x ∈ ∗R). A construction
of such an extension R →֒ ∗R appears in Section 8. For a more detailed
discussion, see Keisler’s textbook Elementary Calculus [66].
6.5. Does calculus become algorithmic over the hyperreals?
Contrary to Fraser’s claim cited in Section 6.1, algorithms indeed play
a central role in analysis exploiting the extension R →֒ ∗R. A typical
example is the definition of the differential ratio dy
dx
for a plane curve
as
st
(
∆y
∆x
)
(6.1)
where ∆x is an infinitesimal x-increment and ∆y is the corresponding
change in the variable y. Here “st” is the standard part function which
rounds off each finite hyperreal number to the nearest real number.
Thus, Robinson’s framework precisely provides an algorithm for com-
puting the differential ratio, which is procedurally similar to Leibniz’s
transcendental law of homogeneity; see Katz–Sherry [65] and Sherry–
Katz [88] for an analysis of the primary sources in Leibniz.
This modern B-track procedure is closer to the historical methods
of the pioneers of the calculus than to the (mathematically equivalent)
modern A-track procedures. This is because the latter involve a non-
constructive notion of limit, where the value L of the limit cannot be
given algorithmically by a formula comparable to (6.1), but rather has
to be given in advance, so that one can then elaborate an Epsilontik
proof that L is the correct value. In this sense, the B-track procedure
as summarized in (6.1) provides a better proxy for Leibniz’s algorithm
than the A-track procedure, contrary to Fraser’s claim. For an anal-
ysis of further constructive and algorithmic aspects of the hyperreal
framework see Sanders [83], [84]. [85].
6.6. Euler’s procedures and their proxies. Another example il-
lustrating the advantage of B-track over A-track when seeking proxies
for the procedures of mathematical analysis as it was practiced histori-
cally is Euler’s definition of the exponential function. Fraser repeatedly
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mentions non-Archimedean analysis and non-Archimedean fields in his
article, but it is not entirely clear whether he understands that the
hyperreals are not merely another non-Archimedean field. In any such
field there are infinitesimals and infinitely large numbers incorporated
in the structure of an ordered field. However, over the hyperreals one
has further structures, such as the theory of infinite, or more precisely
hyperfinite, sums like a1+ . . .+aN where N is an infinite hyperinteger,
as well as infinite products, which provide proxies for Euler’s proce-
dures where A-track proxies are not available; see Bair et al. [4]. Thus
we can follow Euler’s procedure in writing the exponential function ekz
as (
1 +
kz
i
)i
,
where i is infinite number, in [33] vol. I, p. 93, namely an infinite
product. We can also follow Euler when he develops such a product
into an infinite sum using the binomial formula (for an infinite expo-
nent!), where A-track historians see only ‘dreadful foundations’ (see
Section 7.3).
Euler’s application of the binomial formula with an infinite exponent
is rewritten by Ferraro [35, p. 48] in modern
∑
∞
r=0 notation relying on a
Weierstrassian notion of limit (“for every ε > 0 there is an N such that
if n > N then the partial sum satisfies |L−∑ni=0 . . . | < ε, etc.”) Yet
Euler’s procedure here admits a closer proxy in terms of a hyperfinite
sum with i + 1 terms, where i is an infinite hyperinteger; see Bair
et al. [4, p. 222] for a discussion. A related analysis of a reductionist
reading of Euler by H. M. Edwards appears in Kanovei et al. [58].
6.7. Surreal blunder. The surreal number field was developed by
Conway [29] or alternatively by Alling [1]. This field provides an ex-
ample of a B-continuum that possesses no transfer principle.14
Conway’s maximal class surreal field is denoted No. Ehrlich [32]
refers to it as as the absolute arithmetic continuum. This term has
the correct connotations since the surreal system is of some pertinence
specifically in arithmetic, being the absolutely maximal number system
one could possibly develop. This may one day make the Guinness Book
of Records, but the field No is only marginally relevant in analysis, since
even a simple function like the sine function cannot be extended to all
of No. Conway’s system therefore cannot serve as a foundation for
analysis since No does not satisfy transfer beyond being a real closed
field.
14See Section 6.4 for a brief introduction to the transfer principle.
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Namely, there is no surreally defined predicate of being an integer
which still honors transfer. Conway’s own version of surintegers fail to
satisfy transfer since
√
2 turns out to be surrational.
On the other hand, Alling’s surreals are field-isomorphic to a prop-
erly defined hyperreal field with whatever transfer one wishes. Thus
the surreals do admit extensions of the usual relations of being natu-
ral, etc., and the usual functions like the sine function, but only via
the hyperreals, rather than by means of the sur -construction.
Meanwhile, [40, p. 26] lists the surreals as one of the possible frame-
works for non-Archimedean analysis, alongside the hyperreal frame-
work and Bell’s framework for Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis. But,
as noted by Ehrlich [32, Theorem 20], the field No is isomorphic to a
maximal (class) hyperreal field, and therefore cannot be said to be an
independent framework, especially since any transfer principle in the
surreals necessarily derives from the hyperreals. Including the surre-
als on par with these viable frameworks for analysis is a misjudgment
that puts into question Fraser’s technical ability to evaluate the ap-
propriateness of modern mathematical frameworks for interpreting the
procedures of the mathematics of the past.
7. Demonisation of Laugwitz and Euler
In this section we analyze Fraser’s attitude toward the scholarship
of Detlef Laugwitz. It turns out that Fraser repeatedly misrepresents
Laugwitz’s work. Fraser did this on at least two occasions: in his 2008
article for the New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, and in his latest
piece in 2015 for the monograph Delicate Balance. The latter term can
only be applied with difficulty to his one-sided presentation of the state
of Cauchy scholarship today.
7.1. Laugwitz’s scholarship on analysis in Cauchy. In the ab-
stract of his 1987 article in Historia Mathematica, Laugwitz is care-
ful to note that he interprets Cauchy’s sum theorem “with his [i.e.,
Cauchy’s] own concepts”:
It is shown that the famous so-called errors of Cauchy
are correct theorems when interpreted with his own con-
cepts. [70, p. 258]
In the same abstract, Laugwitz goes on to stress that
No assumptions on uniformity or on nonstandard num-
bers are needed. (emphasis added)
Laugwitz proceeds to give a lucid discussion of the sum theorem in
terms of Cauchy’s infinitesimals in section 7 on pages 264–266, with not
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a whiff of modern number systems. In particular this section does not
mention the article Schmieden–Laugwitz [86]. In a final section 15 enti-
tled “Attempts toward theories of infinitesimals,” Laugwitz presents a
general discussion of how one might formalize Cauchyan infinitesimals
in modern set-theoretic terms. A reference to the article by Schmieden
and Laugwitz appears in this final section only. Thus, Laugwitz care-
fully distinguishes between his analysis of Cauchy’s procedures, on the
one hand, and the ontological issues of possible implementations of
infinitesimals in a set-theoretic context, on the other.
7.2. Fraser’s assumptions. Alas, all of Laugwitz’s precautions went
for naught. In 2008, he became a target of damaging innuendo in the
updated version of The Dictionary of Scientific Biography. Here Fraser
writes as follows in his 2008 article on Cauchy:
Laugwitz’s thesis is that certain of Cauchy’s results that
were criticized by later mathematicians are in fact valid
if one is willing to accept certain assumptions about
Cauchy’s understanding and use of infinitesimals. These
assumptions reflect a theory of analysis and infinitesi-
mals that was worked out by Laugwitz and . . . Schmieden
during the 1950s. [39, p. 76] (emphasis added)
Fraser claims that Laugwitz’s interpretation of Cauchy depends on as-
sumptions that reflect a modern theory of infinitesimals. Fraser’s in-
dictment, based on the Omega-theory of Schmieden and Laugwitz (see
e.g., [86]), is off the mark, as we showed in Section 7.1. In the inter-
vening years Fraser has apparently not bothered to read Laugwitz’s
article [70] either. Indeed, Fraser’s verdict is unchanged seven years
later in 2015:
Laugwitz, . . . some two decades following the publi-
cation by Schmieden and him of the Ω-calculus[,] com-
menced to publish a series of articles arguing that their
non-Archimedean formulation of analysis is well suited
to interpret Cauchy’s results on series and integrals. [40,
p. 27]
What Fraser fails to mention is that Laugwitz specifically and explicitly
separated his analysis of Cauchy’s procedures from attempts to account
ontologically for Cauchy’s infinitesimals in modern terms, as we showed
in Section 7.1.
Fraser’s dual strategy in his article involves praising his allies and un-
dermining his opponents. He seeks to present an allegedly united front
of received A-tracker scholarship on Cauchy, while distancing himself
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from Boyer whose bowing down to the triumvirate15 even Fraser finds
it difficult to defend. Fraser also adopts ad hominem arguments when
it comes to dealing with his opponents such as Laugwitz, by suggesting
that their goal in interpreting history involves an inappropriate interpo-
sition of a lens of their professional preoccupations in non-Archimedean
mathematics.
Fraser’s first line of attack, involving an allegedly united Epsilontik
front, is as questionable as the second. Cracks in triumvirate unity are
ubiquitous. Thus, Schubring speaks with surprising frankness about
his disagreement with Grabiner’s ideas on Cauchy–Weierstrass:
I am criticizing historiographical approaches like that
of Judith Grabiner where one sees epsilon-delta already
realized in Cauchy [87, Section 3]
(see also B laszczyk et al. [18]). Fraser similarly overplays his hand when
he quotes Grattan-Guinness’s distinction between history and heritage
in [46]. For it is precisely in his 2004 article that Grattan-Guinness
called explicitly for a re-evaluation of Cauchy, by putting into question
the Epsilontik track, and warns against reading Cauchy as if he had
read Weierstrass already:
The (post-)Weierstrassian refinements have become stan-
dard fare, and are incorporated into the heritage of
Cauchy; but it is mere feedback-style ahistory to read
Cauchy (and contemporaries such as Bernard Bolzano)
as if they had read Weierstrass already . . . On the con-
trary, their own pre-Weierstrassian muddles need his-
torical reconstruction, and clearly [46, p. 176] (emphasis
added).
It is precisely Fraser’s Cauchy–Weierstrass line that is being referred
to as heritage (rather than history) here. Grattan-Guinness also wrote
that Cauchy’s proof of the sum theorem is difficult to interpret be-
cause it is stated in infinitesimal terms (see Section 4.5), acknowledging
the limitations of the A-track approach when it comes to interpreting
Cauchy’s 1853 text [28] on the summation of series. Weierstrass’ fol-
lowers broke with Cauchy’s infinitesimal mathematics, but one will not
discover this by reading Fraser’s comments on Cauchy.
A curious aspect of Fraser’s text is his sweeping claim against the
relevance of modern non-Archimedean theories to the history of anal-
ysis. Fraser’s misunderstandings arguably arise from failing to distin-
guish between procedure and ontology. He fails to cite some of the key
15See note 9 on page 18 for an explanation of the term.
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studies of Euler, such as Kanovei [56] and McKinzie–Tuckey [75]; Laug-
witz’s article [70] is cited but not discussed, and instead misrepresented
by Fraser (see Section 7.2); Laugwitz’s article [71] appears in Fraser’s
bibliography but is not mentioned in the body of Fraser’s article.
7.3. Gray on Euler’s foundations. The relevance of modern B-track
theoretical frameworks can be established by the fact that the routine
A-tracker claims that Euler’s foundations are allegedly dreadful can to-
day be discarded in favor of a far greater appreciation of the coherence
of his infinitesimal techniques (see e.g., Section 6.6). Thus, Euler’s
foundations are described as dreadfully weak by Jeremy Gray:
Euler’s attempts at explaining the foundations of calcu-
lus in terms of differentials, which are and are not zero,
are dreadfully weak. [44, p. 6]
Such sweeping pronouncements come at a high price in anachronism.
Characteristically, Gray does not provide any justification for such a
claim. Such were indeed the received views prior to the work of Robin-
son, Laugwitz, Kanovei, and others.
7.4. Shaky arguments. In a similar vein, Judith Grabiner talks about
shaky arguments and unerring intuition:
. . . eighteenth-century mathematicians had an almost
unerring intuition. Though they were not guided by
rigorous definitions, they nevertheless had a deep under-
standing of the properties of the basic concepts of analy-
sis. This conclusion is supported by the fact that many
apparently shaky eighteenth-century arguments can be
salvaged, etc. [43, p. 358] (emphasis added)
This passage of Grabiner’s sheds no light on how Euler and other 18th
century mathematicians may have hit upon such unerring intuitions to
guide their work in infinitesimal analysis, in the first place. Short of an
account of mathematical intuition, unerring intuition does almost no
explanatory work. It merely tells us that Euler, Lagrange, and others
had a special power. To be sure, there are theories of mathematical in-
tuition; those of Kant and Brouwer come to mind. But neither of those
theories is primarily concerned with a power for making mathematical
discoveries.
The coherence of the procedures of an 18th century master like Euler
is better understood in light of their modern proxies within consistent
theories of infinitesimals, making Euler’s arguments appear less shaky
than those of Fraser, Grabiner, and Gray.
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7.5. Summary of conclusions. We have examined Fraser’s stated
position and analyzed the assumptions underpinning his text [40]. A
summary of our conclusions follows.
7.5.1. Fraser claims that classical analysis, understood as modern
Weierstrassian analysis, is a “primary point of reference” for the his-
toriography of analysis, for the stated reason that it “developed out of
the older subject.” However, Fraser’s claim involves circular reasoning,
since his inference depends on the assumption of a teleological view of
the history of analysis (as having the Weierstrassian framework as its
inevitable goal), criticized by Ian Hacking in terms of the dichotomy
of the butterfly model and the Latin model for the evolution of mathe-
matics.
7.5.2. By adhering to the teleological view, Fraser commits himself
to Boyer’s position while paying lip service to a critique of Boyer’s
subservience to “the great triumvirate” and arithmetisation.
7.5.3. Fraser’s claim that Leibniz allegedly “never developed a coher-
ent theoretical strategy to deal with [infinitesimals]” reveals his lack of
familiarity with recent literature published in Erkenntnis, Studia Leib-
nitiana, and HOPOS, elaborating the details of just such a strategy of
Leibniz’s; see Katz–Sherry [65], Sherry–Katz [88], Bascelli et al. [8].
7.5.4. Fraser claims that no “significant contribution to history” can
result from applying modern theories to the history of analysis, but
he appears to make an exception for modern Archimedean theories
as developed by Weierstrass and his followers, as we showed in the
context of a thought experiment involving (non-) Archimedean issues
in Section 4.1.
7.5.5. The Grabiner–Fraser so-called “Cauchy–Weierstrass” founda-
tion was and remains a tale (for details see Borovik–Katz [20], Katz–
Katz [60], Bascelli et al. [10]), or more specifically an A-tracker ideo-
logical commitment, rather than an accurate historical category.
7.5.6. Fraser’s claim that “Robinson and Lakatos were mistaken in
their assessment of Cauchy” is a non-sequitur exacerbated by Fraser’s
failure to make explicit the alleged mistakes of Robinson and Lakatos.
7.5.7. Fraser wishes to place “Cauchy within a given intellectual and
historical milieu” but in point of fact yanks Cauchy right out of his
milieu and insert him in a 1870 milieu.
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7.5.8. Fraser cites Grattan-Guinness on mathematical history versus
mathematical heritage, but by Gratan-Guinness’s own standard with
regard to Cauchy, it is Fraser himself who indulges in mathematical
heritage at the expense of history.
7.5.9. Fraser’s perhaps most fundamental philosophical blunder is his
failure to appreciate the importance of the distinction of procedure ver-
sus ontology when it comes to interpreting the mathematics of the past.
8. Construction of the hyperreals
Since certain historians find hyperreal numbers to be abstruse (see
Section 4.6), we include a construction of a hyperreal field to demon-
strate that it requires no more background than a serious undergrad-
uate course in algebra including the theorem on the existence of a
maximal ideal.
In an approach to analysis exploiting Robinson’s framework, one
works with the pair R ⊆ ∗R where R is the usual ordered complete
Archimedean continuum, whereas ∗R is a proper extension thereof.
Such a field ∗R could be called a Bernoullian continuum, in honor of Jo-
hann Bernoulli who was the first systematically to use an infinitesimal-
enriched continuum as the foundation for analysis. Robinson’s field ∗R
obeys the transfer principle (see Section 6.3).
A field ∗R can be constructed from R using sequences of real num-
bers. To motivate the construction, it is helpfpul to analyze first the
construction of R itself using sequences of rational numbers. Let QNC
denote the ring of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers. Then
R = QNC /MAX (8.1)
where “MAX” is the maximal ideal in QNC consisting of all null se-
quences (i.e., sequences tending to zero).
The construction of a Bernoullian field can be viewed as a relaxing,
or refining, of the construction of the reals via Cauchy sequences of
rationals. This can be motivated by a discussion of rates of convergence
as follows. In the above construction, a real number u is represented by
a Cauchy sequence 〈un : n ∈ N〉 of rationals. But the passage from 〈un〉
to u in this construction sacrifices too much information. We seek to
retain a bit of the information about the sequence, such as its “speed
of convergence.” This is what one means by “relaxing” or “refining”
the equivalence relation in the construction of the reals from sequences
of rationals.
When such an additional piece of information is retained, two dif-
ferent sequences, say 〈un〉 and 〈u′n〉, may both converge to u ∈ R, but
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at different speeds. The corresponding “numbers” will differ from u
by distinct infinitesimals. For example, if 〈un〉 converges to u faster
than 〈u′n〉, then the corresponding infinitesimal will be smaller. The
retaining of such additional information allows one to distinguish be-
tween the equivalence class of 〈un〉 and that of 〈u′n〉 and therefore ob-
tain distinct hyperreals infinitely close to u. Thus, the sequence 〈 1
n2
〉
generates a smaller infinitesimal than 〈 1
n
〉.
A formal implementation of the ideas sketched above is as follows.
Let us outline a construction of a hyperreal field ∗R. Let RN denote the
ring of sequences of real numbers, with arithmetic operations defined
termwise. Then we have
∗R = RN/MAX (8.2)
where “MAX” is a suitable maximal ideal of the ring RN. What we
wish to emphasize is the formal analogy between (8.1) and (8.2).16
We now describe a construction of such a maximal ideal MAX =
MAXξ in terms of a finitely additive measure ξ. The ideal MAX con-
sists of all “negligible” sequences 〈un〉, i.e., sequences which vanish for
a set of indices of full measure, namely,
ξ
({n ∈ N : un = 0}) = 1.
Here ξ : P(N) → {0, 1} (thus ξ takes only two values, 0 and 1) is
a finitely additive measure taking the value 1 on each cofinite set,17
where P(N) is the set of subsets of N. The subset Fξ ⊆ P(N) consisting
of sets of full measure is called a free ultrafilter. These originate with
Tarski [98]. The construction of a Bernoullian continuum outlined
above was therefore not available prior to that date.
The construction outlined above is known as an ultrapower con-
struction. The first such construction appeared in [52], as did the term
hyper-real. The transfer principle18 for this extension is an immediate
consequence of the theorem of  Los´ [73]. For a recent application in
differential geometry, see Nowik–Katz [79]. For a survey of approaches
to Robinson’s framework, see Fletcher et al. [38].
16In both cases, the subfield is embedded in the superfield by means of constant
sequences.
17For each pair of complementary infinite subsets of N, such a measure ξ “de-
cides” in a coherent way which one is “negligible” (i.e., of measure 0) and which is
“dominant” (measure 1).
18See Section 6.4 on page 27 for an explanation of the term.
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9. Conclusion
We have exploited the dichotomy of A-track versus B-track meth-
ods in the historical development of infinitesimal calculus in analyzing
the work of the great historical authors, including Leibniz, Euler, and
Cauchy. We have paid attention also to the dichotomy of practice
versus ontology. The historiography of mathematics as practiced by
historians whose training was limited to a Weierstrassian framework
falls short of the target when analyzing many of the great historical
authors, due to its failure to attend to the dichotomies mentioned, as
exemplified by work of Lu¨tzen and Fraser.
While we are sympathetic to Barabashev’s sentiment that “as a re-
sult of the elaboration of non-standard analysis, Leibniz’s discovery
is differentiated more and more from Newton’s theory of fluxions and
fluents” [6, p. 38], we feel that a more convincing case involves the rel-
ative advantages of Robinson’s framework in interpreting the historical
infinitesimal analysis as compared to a Weierstrassian framework.
We have followed Ian Hacking’s proposal to approach the history of
mathematics in terms of a Latin (nondeterministic) model of devel-
opment rather than a butterfly (deterministic) model. Carl Boyer’s
account of the historical development of the calculus is a classic exam-
ple of a deterministic model. While in preliminary declarations, Fraser
seeks to distance himself from Boyer’s view of the history of analysis as
inevitable progress toward infinitesimal-frei arithmetisation, actually,
as we show, he commits himself to a position similar to Boyer’s.
We have argued in favor of applying modern mathematical tech-
niques beyond Weierstrass, specifically, foundational studies both in
geometry and arithmetic of real numbers to analyze Euclid’s Elements
and 19th century constructions of real numbers. We have argued
against Fraser’s claim that analysis of historical texts that relies on
modern mathematics beyond Weierstrass cannot produce a significant
contribution to history. Our methodological premise involves apply-
ing Robinson’s framework for analysis with infinitesimals to analyzing
17-, 18- and 19th century mathematical texts, following the pioneering
work of Abraham Robinson and Detlef Laugwitz.
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